REUTERS
Recent moves by the Trump administration have called into question 11 years of US opposition to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
They’ve raised the prospect of President Donald Trump, following many of his predecessors, undertaking his own reset with Russia.
All of which has culminated in fact-challenged US tirades against the president of a country valiantly fighting for its survival against a nuclear superpower that has regularly called the United States an adversary.
How did we get here? And how do we get out?
To Trump’s critics, these events were inevitable. In their view, Trump has always had an affection, or a blind spot, for autocrats, particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin.
So Trump was predestined to make a deal that would undermine beleaguered Ukraine and present new problems for US allies in Europe.
Yet this analysis doesn’t account for an element of Trump’s approach evident since last spring, when he supported passage of a long-delayed US aid package for Ukraine and described the country’s survival as “important” to the United States.
This element grew in importance during the US presidential campaign and afterward, as Trump insisted that he could end the war and achieve a sustainable peace quickly — initially claiming he could do so in 24 hours.
His team even unofficially put out key details of this plan: It required concessions by Ukraine (territorial compromise and at least a 20-year moratorium on NATO membership) and by Russia (acceptance of the deployment of European troops in a demilitarized zone and major arms supplies to Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression).
While Ukraine signaled flexibility on territory, Russia publicly rejected the Trump team’s ideas.
That’s why Trump, during his first days back as president, identified Putin as the obstacle to peace, and spoke of the possibility of applying pressure on Moscow.
Why would Trump do all this — effectively making clear that he now owns this war — if his aim was to sell out Ukraine?
After asserting for months that he can establish a stable peace in Ukraine quickly, he can’t credibly blame his failure to do so on President Joe Biden.
But if Trump’s aim hasn’t been to sell out Ukraine, what explains his team’s recent rhetoric and actions?
The answer lies in the idiosyncrasies of Trump’s diplomacy. While generally ready to use bombast and threats with allies, his rhetorical approach to tyrants of militarily powerful countries can be softer.
This was evident in Trump’s dealings with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un during his first term.
After labeling Kim “Rocket Man,” Trump resorted to flattery to achieve a nuclear deal with North Korea.
Ultimately, however, Trump walked away from negotiations once convinced he could not get a good agreement.
Except for his one outburst of honesty about Putin as an obstacle to peace in Ukraine, Trump’s approach to Russia has been of this softer variety — evident especially since the Feb. 12 telephone call between him and Putin.
When that led to a meeting between US and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia without Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed concern, sparking an intemperate reaction from Trump, and then a louder exchange between the two.
None of it was good for either side: Zelensky needs US support against Putin’s ongoing aggression and Trump wants a fast, enduring peace, which isn’t possible without Ukrainian buy-in.
Putin wants to stall a deal so he can have more time to take additional Ukrainian territory and kick Ukraine’s troops out of Russia’s Kursk oblast.
Trump’s sparring with Zelensky gives Putin reason to think he need not compromise, placing the US president in a pickle of his own making.
That hurts Trump politically. Though his MAGA base may enjoy the rhetorical fireworks, The Wall Street Journal and the New York Post, which have been generally supportive of Trump, have called him out for creating this predicament.
More gently, over a dozen Republican lawmakers have publicly recited facts that contradict most of the claims Trump made in recent days.
All the while, Putin just sits back and enjoys the spectacle.
This situation is far from hopeless. The tensions between Trump and Zelensky are superficial.
On Friday, Trump backtracked somewhat on his claim Zelensky “started” the war, saying only he and Biden could’ve avoided it via better diplomacy.
Meanwhile, Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special presidential envoy, has been in Kyiv for talks with the Ukrainian leader and his team.
They’ve reportedly continued to discuss a deal on rare-earth and critical minerals, and perhaps other topics, which may give both presidents occasion to return to the pressing business of coordinating positions in order to persuade Putin to end his war on Ukraine.
This could get Trump out of his pickle, and put the onus for peace back where it belongs: on the Kremlin.
The Trump team could expedite this by making clear in public that, in fact, Russia is the aggressor.
And the Zelensky team can keep things on track by conveying any concerns it has with the Trump team’s tactics in private channels.
John Herbst, former ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan, is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.