What’s at stake for America in Syria after Bashar al-Assad

Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s murderer-in-chief, has fled to Moscow. The people are celebrating, tearing down posters of Assad and statues of his equally vicious father, who founded the regime.

But the driving force behind these changes is a terrorist organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, that is the offspring of a complicated relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

The leader of HTS is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who began his career fighting US troops in Iraq. He rejects the label of terrorist and wears a suit jacket for interviews with Western media.

Days ago, a CNN correspondent asked if “strict Islamic rule” was still Jolani’s plan for Syria. His answer? “People who fear Islamic governance . . . do not understand it properly.”

This may not allay the fears of those who remember the trail of broken promises the Taliban left behind when they returned to power in Afghanistan three years ago.

Those with longer memories may recall Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Ayatollah Khomeini’spledge that the people would rule, not the clerics.

Americans across the political spectrum want no part in Syria’s internal conflicts, but we have interests we can’t afford to ignore.

The first is the fate of American hostages in Assad’s prisons, like Austin Tice, as well as the remains of those who died in captivity, like Majd Kamalmaz.

Next, there is the matter of Syria’s chemical weapons, which should not fall into the hands of a terrorist organization regardless of what it promises.

Israel has reportedly struck multiple sites associated with Assad’s chemical-weapons program, but that is a stop-gap at best.

What the United States and allies should expect from the new Syrian government is unconditional permission for international inspectors to document and dismantle any remnants of Assad’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Washington has ample leverage it can employ to prod HTS and Syria’s interim government in the right direction.

There is a comprehensive sanctions regime in place that the United States should unwind gradually and only in exchange for clear moves in a positive direction.

The US military has also spent more than a decade working with local partners in northeast Syria to dismantle the ISIS caliphate and then prevent an ISIS comeback.

Those local partners — mainly Kurdish, but also some Arab — happen to control the region that is home to most of Syria’s oil and gas reserves. It is also the country’s agricultural center.

Without the cooperation of Washington and its local partners, Syria’s new government will not be able to tap those resources.

If HTS is content to rule the mountains of rubble Assad left behind, it may not respond positively to any of the incentives Washington offers.

Yet Jolani’s promises of moderation suggest he is ready for a diplomatic dance in which each side seeks to maneuver the other into a position of pliability.

The best outcome for Syria would be a system of government in which the people exercise civil liberties and elect their leaders. And perhaps the people will exert enough pressure on HTS to make that happen, but those with the guns usually make the rules.

Thus, the United States will have to consider carefully what demands are realistic. The release of hostages and complete dismantling of Assad’s chemical weapons program should be non-negotiable.

It is also reasonable to expect that Damascus shut down the multibillion-dollar narco-trafficking enterprise that Assad built to fund his regime in its final years.

If the new leaders in Damascus cannot say yes to those requests, they should expect to remain pariahs.

The next priority should be an understanding, likely informal, that the US-led anti-ISIS coalition be allowed to continue its mission.

HTS claims it is prepared to respect Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities, including Kurds and Christians, but there may be need to discuss the details.

The most contentious questions may be the extent of political freedom and Syrians relations with other US-designated terrorist groups.

Will HTS allow Syrians to establish political parties and an independent media? Will there be elections?

Will Syria turns its back on other jihadists, or welcome their leaders, like America’s supposed allies in Turkey and Qatar?

Washington’s careful use of incentives may help direct Syria toward moderation and away from an Islamist dictatorship.

David Adesnik is vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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