President Bill Clinton is on to the right formula for stopping the tragedy in Bosnia. With his decision to end the siege of Sarajevo by, if needed, the use of NATO air power, Clinton has put together the three key ingredients for a lasting solution: presidential leadership; the use of military muscle to support diplomacy, and the articulation of a political end game.
It this formula is to succeed, however, it must be rigorously adhered to and expanded on. Because of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s ultimatum and its visible preparations to destroy weapons that still pose a threat to Sarajevo, momentum is on the side of the peacemakers. But the current cease-fire is tenuous. Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike are poised to continue the battle. The Serbs, in particular, have repeatedly demonstrated that they press ahead with aggression whenever they perceive the West is distracted or lacks the resolve to carry out its threats.
As the war in the former Yugoslavia has unfolded, concern about sustaining domestic support for military intervention has constrained the Clinton Administration’s willingness to put the lives of U.S. soldiers at risk. Indeed, the public outcry that followed an ill-fated U.S. raid against a Somali warlord in Mogadishu last October made clear the potential costs at home of even well-intentioned engagement abroad.
But the ubiquity of the media and its ability to project gruesome images into the home of virtually every American cuts both ways. Had it not been for the recent bloodletting in Sarajevo’s central market–and the public outrage its coverage produced–it is doubtful that NATO would now be standing ready to silence the guns outside the city.
Yet, powerful images of suffering can not be allowed to hold U.S. foreign policy hostage. And they cannot–now that Clinton has addressed the nation and explained to the public the national interests at stake in Bosnia. Otherwise, support for military intervention would wane when the first U.S. pilot falls into Serb hands.
Before yesterday’s remarks, the shortcomings in the Administration’s message were a function of presentation, not substance. In a Feb. 9 press conference–on the same day NATO set its 10-day deadline for the withdrawal of Serb weapons–Clinton outlined three reasons why U.S. participation in air strikes would be justified: to prevent the war from spreading; to ensure NATO remains a viable alliance capable of orchestrating collective action in pursuit of common interests; to end continuing slaughter of civilians.
Clinton’s message that day, though on target, was lost in the flurry of media coverage over the NATO ultimatum. Now this is no longer the case. Clinton’s comments were vital to lay a solid foundation for U.S. action. Indeed, the character of post-Cold War Europe and the credibility of its chief security organization are at stake in Bosnia–and this is well worth a prime time speech.
As the public and the foreign-policy Establishment grapple with what the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world should be, there is no substitute for presidential leadership. Not since the end of World War II has a U.S. President had to play such a weighty role in helping Americans choose between the responsibilities of a new internationalism and the illusory comfort of disengagement.
Clinton’s leadership is no less important in Europe. The West Europeans simply are not ready to act on their own. Constrained by weak governments, limited military capabilities and internal tensions within the European Union, Western Europe will take action in the Balkans only if Washington serves as the catalyst.
Should the Administration fail to galvanize collective efforts, it is not only the Bosnian Muslims and the credibility of NATO that will suffer. Serbs and opportunistic nationalists in other parts of Europe will be emboldened if aggression in Bosnia continues unchecked. In this sense, the historical analogy to the West’s appeasement of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s is appropriate–acquiescence only whet Adolf Hitler’s appetite.
But of even greater importance is the corroding effect of inaction on the Western democracies. The appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 came after a series of failed efforts to stop aggression had already undermined the principle that like-minded powers would work in concert to preserve peace. Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 went unanswered, as did Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Part of the problem was that the leaders failed to apprise their electorates of the imminent danger to peace posed by the Nazi regime.
Clinton will not repeat this mistake. In the threat that it poses to Europe, Serbia is not Nazi Germany. But tolerating Serbian aggression in Bosnia saps the spirit of shared responsibility in preserving a European order that undergirds the West’s security community. Failure to act–and to build the necessary public support–would fuel go-it-alone attitudes in the Western Alliance.
As Washington and its key European allies seek to build a new security order, they cannot allow NATO’s essential multilateralism to corrode. Should events in the Balkans call into question the integrity of the Western security community, the prospects for NATO and its efforts to embrace Europe’s new democracies look gloomy. If, on the other hand, Clinton can orchestrate a joint response to aggression in Bosnia, he will do much to ensure that the spirit of collective security flourishes.
Using military force to back up diplomacy is the second key ingredient of a peaceful solution. NATO has tried before to use threats of military action to restrain the Serbs and influence the peace negotiations. But previous efforts failed–in part because the threats themselves were ambiguous.
Coercive diplomacy works best when threats are well-defined. By setting a clear deadline and outlining exactly what the Serbs must do to avoid air strikes, NATO has removed the ambiguity that allowed the pummeling of Sarajevo to continue. Clinton has only strengthened NATO’s leverage by playing a more vocal role in outlining the policy to build domestic support for its implementation.
If the Serbs do not comply with the ultimatum, NATO must strike quickly. If the Serbs do comply, NATO must extend similar protection to the other besieged Muslim enclaves in Bosnia.
The immediate objective of this strategy is to stop the bloodshed and begin the process of making Sarajevo and other areas again habitable. At the same time, the threat of NATO retaliation and, if necessary, the carrying out of that threat, must be used to ensure that aggression–whether by Serbs, Croats or Bosnian Muslims–entails high costs. Only when the purveyors of violence understand that aggression will be punished will they negotiate seriously toward a political end game–the third key ingredient of a lasting solution.
At the same time that he opted for a NATO ultimatum, Clinton endorsed the notion that Bosnia will ultimately have to be carved into three autonomous regions–each more or less ethnically homogeneous. Justifiably, the Administration had long resisted this formula–long-term stability in Europe’s East depends on the viability, not the fragmentation, of multiethnic states.
But the Administration is right to temper principle with pragmatism. Bosnian is too far gone to hold out hope of rebuilding a multiethnic state. Rolling back Serb and Croatian aggression in Bosnia would require large numbers of U.N. or NATO ground troops to serve in a combat, not a peacekeeping, role. Regrettably, partitioning Bosnia along ethnic lines now makes the most sense.
Moving each of the warring parties toward an agreement will not be easy, but inducements are already in place. The threat of air strikes and the promise of lifting economic sanctions on Serbia should go far not only to moderate Serb behavior on the battlefield, but also to scale back Serb demands at the negotiating table. Flexing NATO’s military muscle will have similar effect on the Croats.
The Bosnian government and the people it represents have the most to lose by accepting partition; little more than the prospect of peace can be used to bring them to the table. NATO’s declared intention to send ground forces to enforce a peace settlement helps brighten these prospects. The Administration can take one additional step.
The President should continue to press the international community to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians in return for their adherence to a peace agreement. A controlled, incremental lifting of the embargo is key to reconstructing stable and defensible communities in a new Bosnia. Without the means to defend themselves, the Muslim population will continue to suffer under Serb intimidation, if not aggression. If the role of U.N. and NATO forces is to be limited, responsibility for preserving the security of all three regions must rest with local militias.
Clinton is poised for a much-needed success in the Balkans. He has finally found a path that can bring an end to the savagery. Taking this path, however, will require continued determination and, above all, presidential leadership in explaining to the American public the importance of the U.S. interests at stake and the consequent responsibilities that Americans must bear. Bosnia’s future, and Europe’s, hang in the balance.*