It’s still a working class election, which is a problem for Democrats

Democrats are nothing short of giddy. President Biden, who looked like a sure loser, bowed out of the presidential race and was seamlessly replaced by Kamala Harris through deft and lightning-fast intraparty maneuvering. The race is reset! All is possible!

Who can blame Democrats for being a bit slap happy? They were staring into the abyss and now have a reprieve.

They have a younger candidate and a more enthusiastic, unified party. Those are important and positive differences.

But there are also similarities to their previous situation that are highly negative and can’t be wished away.

For one: working-class (non-college) voters will likely determine the outcome of the 2024 election.

They will be the overwhelming majority of eligible voters (around two-thirds) and, even allowing for turnout patterns, only slightly less dominant among actual voters (around three-fifths).

Moreover, in all six key swing states — Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin — the working-class share of the electorate, both as eligible voters and as projected 2024 voters, will be higher than the national average.

It follows that significant deterioration in working-class support could put Harris in a very deep hole nationally and key states.

Conversely, a burgeoning advantage among working-class voters would likely put Donald Trump in a dominant position.

This is very important to keep in mind as we are swamped by a tsunami of favorable Harris coverage in legacy and other center-left media.

Where once her retail political skills were disparaged, we are told that she is now (or always has been) a consummately effective, charismatic retail politician.

Polls of course will be scrutinized for signs that the race is shifting in the Democrats’ favor and even small changes will be interpreted as signs that Trump is on the run.

But in truth it will take a few weeks for the race to settle out and one should be cautious about interpreting initial results.

That said, what we have seen so far does not suggest a fundamentally altered race.

Trump was ahead and is still ahead. Democrats still badly trail among working-class voters and have compressed margins among nonwhite and young voters relative to 2020.

Of course, that may change in coming weeks but that is what we see now.

Looking at the running poll averages, we have the following for Trump-Harris matchups: RCP has Trump over Harris by 1.7 pointsNew York Times has Trump over Harris by 2 points and DDHQ/The Hill has Trump by 2 points. Pretty consistent.

Another approach is to compare averages of Biden vs. Trump and Harris vs. Trump.

Naturally, these only overlap when Biden was the actual candidate and Harris was a notional candidate. But the data are still of interest.

Split Ticket has the most recent data on this, covering the month of July, and they do not show much difference between the candidates.

Harris does slightly worse overall, with a margin against Trump .4 points worse than Biden. She does worse among men, a bit better among women; worse among seniors, better among those under 30; worse among whites and Hispanics and better among blacks and, significantly, worse among working-class voters and better among the college-educated. But the differences are generally quite small.

If you confine one’s sample of polls to those that were entirely in the field after Biden dropped out (i.e., after July 20), rather than just partially — a tiny group — there are clear signs of a tightening race. But Trump is still ahead.

CNN is one of those polls and it does indeed show Harris doing better against Trump than Biden did prior to dropping out. But Trump is still ahead and, interestingly, Harris is doing no better against Trump than she did before Biden dropped out — in fact, a bit worse (3-point deficit now vs. a 2-point deficit in late June).

And the internal demographics are quite similar to the earlier reading and all run far behind how Biden did in the 2020 election. Notably, her working-class deficit to Trump is 15 points, compared to Biden’s 4 point deficit in 2020.

These double digit Democratic deficits among the working class have been a regular feature of this election cycle.

These deficits have been driven by worsening performance among the white working class (recall that Biden in 2020 actually did a bit better among these voters relative to Clinton in 2016) and much lower margins among nonwhite working-class voters.

It is difficult to see how Harris prevails without strong progress on this front.

Can she do it? Sure, anything’s possible. But Democrats would be well-advised to be clear-eyed about the challenge.

What Harris has to overcome is illustrated by an early July Pew poll that had a large enough sample size (N=over 9,400) to allow blacks and Hispanics to be broken down by working-class vs. college-educated.

Both racial groups show strong educational polarization that is much larger than what was observed in 2020.

Hispanic working-class voters in this poll preferred Trump by 3 points over Biden, compared to a 22 point margin for Biden over Trump in 2020.

Among black working-class voters, Biden was leading by 47 points over Trump, compared to an 82 point lead for Biden in 2020.  

A working class-oriented campaign would appear to be in order. But so far there is little indication that is what the Harris campaign has in mind.

widely-circulated memo from the campaign sees Harris’ candidacy as building on the “Biden-Harris coalition of voters” and mentions black voters, Latino voters, AANHPI voters, women voters and young voters.

Working-class voters are conspicuous by their absence. The memo proposes to expand this coalition among, for example, white college-educated voters by taking advantage of the fact that: “…[Harris] has been at the forefront on the very issues that are most important to these voters—restoring women’s reproductive rights and upholding the rule of law following January 6, Donald Trump’s criminal convictions, and the Supreme Court’s immunity decision.”

There is little mention of any other issues. This is despite the fact that Harris is rated far below Trump on handling issues like crime, inflation, and immigration. The latter two issues typically top voters’ list of concerns.

To the extent Harris has talked about issues other than abortion, “democracy is on the ballot,” and Trump’s character it has been to emphasize, according to Axios, that: “…she’ll pursue big — and expensive — parts of Joe Biden’s domestic agenda that never made it across the finish line…Harris is signaling that even as Democrats play defense on Biden’s mixed economic record, she’s eager to go on offense for the next four years… Her plans include pushing for nearly $2 trillion to establish universal pre-K education and improve elderly care and child care…”

This seems…unwise in light of working-class voters’ inflation fears and how poorly they view Biden administration economic management.

Pushing for massively increased spending is highly unlikely to win them over to your side, even if they approve of some of the end goals.

As some of the saner voices on the left have noted, Harris needs to make a serious effort to assure skeptical voters, particularly working-class voters, that she will in fact do things differently from the Biden administration on key issues where Democrats are vulnerable.

David Leonhardt mentions crime, immigration, inflation, gender issues, and free speech. As Leonhardt points out:

“Democrats often describe Donald Trump and other Republicans as radical….But many voters also see the Democratic Party as radical. In fact, the average American considers the Democratic Party to be further from the political mainstream than the Republican Party……

“[S]uccessful presidential candidates reassure voters that they are more moderate than their party. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Biden all did in their own ways. Even Trump did in 2016, by supporting Social Security, opposing trade deals, and endorsing same-sex marriage. The strategy works because most voters see themselves as less conservative than the Republican Party and less liberal than the Democratic Party….

“[These politicians] were sending a larger message. It was the same one Clinton sent when he called himself “a new Democrat” and George W. Bush did with his talk of “compassionate conservatism.” It was also the one Trump recently tried to send by saying he opposed a national abortion ban.

“All these politicians were asserting their independence from their own parties. It’s hard to get elected president without doing so.”

So far there is little indication that Harris will do anything of the kind. As Politico Playbook noted: “Three sources in Harris’ orbit we spoke to said people expecting Harris to take drastically different positions [to distinguish herself from Biden] are going to end up disappointed.”  

Thus, instead of a “different kind of Democrat” what voters will likely get is a younger, nonwhite, female version of the same kind of Democrat. Put another way, the Democrats seem content to remain a Brahmin Left party and see how things work out.

Gulp.

From Ruy Teixeira’s substance, The Liberal Patriot.

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